common understandings regarding the interpretation and amendment of the treaty

procedures for dismantling and destruction

procedures for replacement, dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or components

locations for ABM components

demarcation between ABM and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TMD) systems

Thus a great deal of diplomatic, political and technical time and money have been invested in the infrastructure concerning this Treaty. The resulting terms of agreement are now set out in some over 20 documents.

Official statements have been made repeatedly from Russia and China to indicate the high level of concern they have with the breach of the Treaty. Why are they concerned? The Treaty was created to ensure equal vulnerability of both the US and Russia to nuclear weapons attack. What would happen if the US could build a missile defence?

First, the Russians and Chinese would know the effectiveness of their nuclear attack would be lessened due to the use of defences. They would then proceed to build more nuclear weapons to reinstate their power. This is precisely what is being stated now by Russia and China.

Second, if the US has missile defence, then could then plan to make a first strike against Russian nuclear forces - hoping that their defences would take care of destroying any retaliatory strike by the leftover Russian nuclear forces. If the US develops this technical capability in future, they would have the incentive to strike first to remove the bulk of the Russian weapons.

The Treaty restricts the US and Russia to the deployment of one field of 100 interceptors to defend either a missile field or the nation’s capital. It restricts defences to allow countries to rely on their nuclear defence at lower numbers of nuclear weapons. If ballistic missile defence are built in defiance of this agreement, the process of nuclear weapons reductions will end.

Specifically, the US National Missile Defence program would:

Violate Article One of the ABM Treaty This Article requires Parties to the Treaty to limit anti-ballistic missile systems and to undertake not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country. Both Parties acknowledge that the National Missile Defense Program is a clear breach of this provision.

Violate Article Three of the ABM Treaty This Article restricts the location of ABM system deployment areas. This would be breached by

* the deployment of interceptors in Alaska

* the deployment of the large phased array X-Band Battle management radars in Alaska

Violation of Article Five This Article requires, inter alia, that the Parties not develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are space-based. This would be violated by the deployment of SBIRS (“Space-Based Infra-Red System”)satellite networks.

Violation of Article Six Ban In this Article, Parties undertake not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory”. This would be breached by elements of the SBIRS satellite networks.

Violation of Article Nine This Article requires that each Party undertake not to transfer to other States and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components This would be violated by the deployment of radars in Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales UK.

2. The START II Treaty

We are particularly concerned with the state of play between the US and Russia as Russia has just advised in its Letter of April 2000 concerning the ratification of the START II Treaty that two of the extraordinary events giving the Russian Federation the right to withdraw from the START II Treaty....shall be “the United States of America’s withdrawal from the [ABM Treaty] or the infringement of the aforesaid Treaty and respective agreements”.

3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty

Article VI of the NPT obligates all 187 states parties to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice unanimously concluded:

“There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” (para. 105(2)(F))

The US has persistently resisted calls to engage in nuclear weapons negotiations and has thus failed to comply with Article VI of the NPT.

Countries reliant now upon their nuclear weapons for “defence” will see the effectiveness of that defence lessened should the NMD program become operative. The response will be to build more nuclear weapons. By providing an obvious incentive for nuclear and near-nuclear states to proceed with increases rather than reductions in their nuclear weapons arsenals, NMD encourages noncompliance with the NPT.

4. INF Agreement, Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention

If states believe that their nuclear weapons may be less effective due to missile defences, this may justify and indeed provoke states into reliance upon intermediate range nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons in violation of the Intermediate-Forces Agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

5. The Outer Space Treaty

A DFAIT survey of law applicable to space states that the Outer Space Treaty “is regarded as the cornerstone international space law convention. ...” They note three themes “freedom of exploration and use, peaceful use and cooperation and international responsibility of states for their activities in outer space.”

We need to take a careful look at several articles to get a sense of the intent of the Treaty.

Article I

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer Space, .....shall be free for exploration and use by all States.....in accordance with international law....

Article II

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

Thus space should be free for exploration and use by all states on the basis of equality.

What then does the US Space Command appear to be planning? The motto of the US Space Command is as follows:

US Space Command – dominating the space dimension of military operations

to protect US interests and investment.

Integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities

across the full spectrum of conflict.

There appear to be two basic documents in force: Vision for 2020 and a Long Range Plan. (Both are available at: http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/ ) The explanation of these documents states

“The United States Space Command's Vision for 2020 guides how our military space strategy will evolve in the 21st Century and is the standard for measuring the progress of USSPACECOM and its components Army Space Command, Naval Space Command, and AFSPACE (14th AF). To carry out the Vision, we have developed a very ambitious and much needed Long Range Plan (LRP).

“The LRP integrates military space planning to achieve USSPACECOM's Vision for 2020...”

The Joint Vision document opens by stating that “The medium of space is the fourth medium of warfare - along with land, sea, and air. ...”

Chapter 2 of the Long Range Plan includes the following commentary evidencing their plan to militarize and Americanize the use of space.(Please excuse the length of this quotation, but its contents are critical to understanding the eventual implications of NMD. The bold lettering we have inserted to identify key concerns):

Global Engagement

Global Engagement (GE) is the combination of global surveillance of the Earth (see anything, anytime), worldwide missile defense, and the potential ability to apply force from space. GE addresses increasing ballistic and cruise missile threats, the need for force application, and the need for effective forward presence with reduced forward basing. By 2020, a second generation system for National Missile Defense is expected to be in place‑with many of the weapons and sensors potentially moving into space. Surveillance and strike missions for land, sea, and air will improve using space systems. For example, a force application system based in space could be available for strategic attack, and space‑based surveillance may augment systems on land and in

[continuation of quotation from US Space Command website:]

the air. At present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with US national policy. Planning for the possibility is a purpose of this plan should our civilian leadership decide that the application of force from space is in our national interest.

Control of Space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required. Achieving and maintaining Control of Space will influence all national and military objectives. Future space programs will be "consumer oriented" to assure information dominance to the warfighter. This operational concept encompasses today's missions of space control and space support (Launch and Satellite Control).

END STATE

By 2020, we'll have a robust and wholly integrated suite of capabilities in space and on the ground. They will enable us to have situational understanding in space and to ensure access to, through, and from space while defending against all hostile threats. Maintaining dominance of space will require new systems, concepts of operation, and organizations. ......

Finally, Negation means applying military force to affect an adversary's space capability by targeting ground‑support sites, ground‑to‑space links, or spacecraft. Negation will be executed when prevention fails. High‑priority targets include an enemy's ability to hold US and allied space systems at risk. Negation will evolve from current concepts, which emphasize terrestrial attacks on an adversary's ground nodes, to a full range of flexible and discriminate techniques against the most appropriate node. Acting under clear lines of authority and rules of engagement, USCINCSPACE will take actions necessary to meet the National Command Authorities' objectives and defend our nation's vital space interests. Actions will range from temporarily disrupting or denying hostile space systems to degrading or destroying them. Our objectives must consider third‑party use, plausible deniability and how actions will add to debris or otherwise affect the environment.

A robust battle management capability is crucial to the execution of the entire operations concept. The battle manager will automatically cue systems; fuse information from surface‑, air‑, and space‑based systems; and distribute tailored information from all sources and at multiple levels of security to various users in real or near real time. Besides providing a common operating picture, USSPACECOM Battle Managers will also provide the status of forces, planning tools, decision aids, and execution paths needed to control space. This information will allow USCINCSPACE to select and employ the proper response against threats, assess combat results, and reengage if the threats aren't neutralized.

Thus the goal appears to be to develop dominant military capability and be able to deny, rather than share access in space. Control of space is required to give dominance to warfighters.

International law, in sharp contrast, requires cooperation to ensure the maintenance of peace.

The Outer Space Treaty further requires:

Article III

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

When reference is made to the international law and the Charter, we must then turn there for our source of law. In defining the purposes of the UN, The Charter states:

Article I

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

Article 2

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force aainst the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.

We’ve already noted that US Space Command says it is “integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict”. This is clearly not a recipe for peacebuilding and cooperation. The Long Term Planning documentation reveals a hostile plan whereby the US views space as its next area of vital national interest. It plans to dominate space by force and high technology information systems. The plan involves denial of access to others and a battlefield complete with battle managers and warfighters. Any action perceived to put American or their allies space systems at risk becomes a high priority target.

The Long Range Plan quotes in a favourable light this quote from something called the NDP Report:

"Given the importance of space‑based capabilities to information operations, our ability to operate in space, support military activities from space and deny adversaries the use of space will be key to our future military success." NDP Report, December 1997

Again, this reveals a clear intent to violate the assurances contained in the Outer Space Treaty that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes.

Participation in such a hostile and unlawful plan of action is clearly outside Canada’s purview as a country supportive of the building of peace.

6. International Political Resistance to NMD Grows

To better understand the international political context within NMD is placed, it is important for Canadians to clearly understand the level of concern that has been expressed about this program and its potential to harm the current arms control architecture.

The enormity of the effects of this plan are summarized in the following comment:

“Having thoroughly alienated Moscow on both NATO and ABM, while at the same time standing idly by as Russia topples into irreparable collapse, the Administration is leading the world perilously close to strategic hell: a strengthening of Russia's authoritarian and fascist pathologies; a greater likelihood that a bankrupt and embittered former superpower will resort to selling nuclear weapons to the Irans of the world; an inducement to China to accelerate its strategic modernization in converting from liquid‑ to solid‑fueled launchers, in turn propelling India and Pakistan forward on their nuclear courses; an invitation to nations everywhere to pursue and proliferate NMD‑defeating cruise missiles and multi‑warhead ICBMs.” “Paving the Way to Strategic Hell”, Aviation Week And Space Technology, 1 February 1999

The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan said the ABM was a cornerstone of

strategic stability and warned that attempts to prevent an arms race in outer space may fail if the 1972 treaty was broken. Annan urged flexibility and agreement on a tangible program of negotiations for the year.....(ABC World News 1/18/00)

The Russian Government has spoken out. Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Mikhailove, General Anatoly Kvashing, head of the Russian General Staff, Col.-Gen. Leonid Ivashov, head of the defence Ministry’s International Cooperation Division, Maj-Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, head of Russia’s strategic missile research institute, the Russian Foreign Ministry, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Vladimir Rakhmanin, Senior Russian Foreign Ministry official and diplomat Grigory V. Berdennikov, Vladimir Luk, Chair of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee have all expressed their concern with the maintenance of the ABM Treaty.

The Chinese government has spoken out and sponsored a Resolution at the UN. Chinese Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Sha Zukang, Nov. 11, 1999:

“[I]t is the advanced systems in space and elsewhere, that are the problem. These are a violation of the ABM Treaty. These may disturb or destroy the strategic balance.....Any amendment, or abolishing of the treaty, will lead to disastrous consequences. This will bring a halt to nuclear disarmament now between the Russians and Americans, and in the future will halt multilateral disarmament as well. “

Reuters has also reported on Feb. 11, 1999 that:

China on Thursday attacked U.S. proposals to develop new missile defence systems

against rogue states, saying their deployment could turn outer space into a “new battlefield.''

Li Changhe, China's ambassador to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD), said that U.S. plans to amend the Anti‑Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty so as to pursue the defence umbrella would upset the global strategic balance.

European governments are said to be uniformly opposed:

The trans‑Atlantic disagreement over the importance of missile defense reflects a gulf in perception between Europeans, who do not feel high on anyone's hit‑list, and Americans, who after two decades of mounting anti‑terrorist crusading, now feel that their territory could be a prime

target......

European governments, without exception, oppose the U.S. anti‑missile project. In public, they caution against meddling with arms control treaties that could goad Russia into a nuclear weapons buildup. Privately, they fulminate against the program as technological folly ‑ illusory protection against a remote threat.

These governments berate the Clinton administration, and the U.S. Congress for what allied officials call a fresh example of American arrogance and unilateralism. (“Washington's Pursuit of Missile Defense Drives Wedge in NATO”, by Joseph Fitchett, International Herald Tribune, Paris February 15, 2000)

The Danish Parliament and Greenland’s home rule parliament are urging the veto of US plans for NMD.

“Parties representing a clear majority set Russian approval of amendments to the ABM‑Treaty as a precondition for upgrading of existing early warning radar facilities and deployment of a planned new radar....”

“Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen on February 25^th repeatedly stressed his government's "desire" for use of the radar "not to be in violation of current international rules". He also called a 13 year‑old resolution by Parliament, prohibiting use of the radar in connection with an ABM‑system, "a firm component" of Danish policy.”

‘Opposition is also voiced by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, an influential coalition of native peoples from Alaska, Canada, Russia and Greenland.” (Danish Opposition May Impede US National Missile Defense, by Joergen Dragsdahl for BASIC, March 2000)

Thus Canada would simply be joining the majority by speaking out against NMD.

7. Alternatives Successfully Tried

In responding to the North Korean threat of nuclear weapons production, the US successfully negotiated an Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994. This Agreement brought DPRK into full compliance under the NPT, allows implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement and ensures DPRK power through supervised nuclear power plants.

When North Korea threatened South Asia with its ballistic missile test, a further agreement was negotiated. It is described as follows in The Arms Control Association Chronology: